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Over the last twenty years or so, the firm has changed considerably, especially with the 
growing importance of human capital. Paradoxically, the primacy of the shareholder value 
model has endured. The aim of this paper is to explore the main theoretical and empirical 
elements involved to propose a new model of firm governance. We view strategic employees 
of firms as critical resources because they represent specific human capital. We explain that 
the inalienable residual rights of control they have over their own human capital are 
inconsistent with disciplinary models of corporate governance. They rather call for the 
creation of an internal mode of regulation able to effectively mobilize specific human capital 
by motivating key employees. This model, which we call the ‘multi-resource model’, is 
composite: we show that it aims to encourage, retain and collectively enrich critical resources 
by using an original operational system based on complementary instruments of incentive and 
coordination. 
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As competition has heightened since the early 1990s, technological progress has led to 
the decline of the “modern business enterprise” which is vertically integrated, intensive in 
physical capital and characterized by a separation between ownership and control (Berle & 
Means, 1932; Chandler A. J., 1977; 1990). Large conglomerates have been broken up and 
their units have been spun-off as stand-alone firms. Vertically integrated manufacturers have 
relinquished direct control of their suppliers, and moved towards inter-firm relationships. 
Different disintegrated forms (outsourcing, subcontracting, etc.) have been developed, related 
to the decreasing optimal size of units of production, the increasing modularity of productive 
activities and the growing differentiation of final demand (Brusoni, Prencipe, & Pavitt, 2001). 
In globalized economies, innovation results from these recent industrial reorganizations; 
nevertheless, innovation gives rise to two contradictory phenomena. On the one hand, the 
propensity to innovate depends on increasing needs for financing. Financial deregulation has 
strengthened competition between financial institutions and developed new instruments to 
control and share risk (Colletis, 2007). Moreover, financial revolution has attracted external 
investors and given more control to shareholders while stock market use has extended. 
Financial and accounting transparency to strict international standards is increasingly required 
of borrowers by investors and analysts. In this context, the shareholder model of corporate 
governance, emblematic of joint-stock companies and thus of the modern business enterprise, 
became established: during the two last decades, corporate strategies in favor of shareholder 
value creation have been intensified. Corporations have adopted a “downsize and distribute” 
principle based on cutting the size of their labor force (downsize), in an attempt to increase the 
return on equity to increase dividends (distribute) (Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000, p. 18)1
                                                            
1 The “downsize and redistribute” regime follows a corporate governance principle already based on the 
maximization of shareholder value. The latter is called “retain and reinvest” (Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000, p. 
14). In this previous regime, corporations tended to retain both the money that they earned and the people whom 
they employed, and to reinvest in physical capital and complementary human resources. 
. On 
the other hand, the propensity to innovate depends on increasing needs for specific intangible 
resources. In particular, the demand for innovative process and quality improvement can only 
be satisfied by specialized and mobile employees. Innovation comes from specific human 
capital at every stage of the production process. Thus, human capital tends to be more 
important than inanimate assets and employees tend to get involved in a participative work 
organization of a post-Taylorian form (Bué, 1996; Lorenz & Valeyre, 2004). Specialized 
employees with a unique skill or a particular know-how represent valuable resources which 
are immaterial, inalienable and non-imitable instantaneously (Kochan & Rubinstein, 2000). 
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Specialized employees control assets able to minimize many transactional and productive 
costs so that the firm can improve its competitive position. As the importance of human 
capital has grown, power has moved away from the top management; power is much more 
widely dispersed through the firm, in particular in the hands of key employees because they 
represent decisive resources for the firm. Finally, the separation between ownership and 
control becomes blurred in the present firm but does not challenge the shareholder primacy 
view of corporate governance. This paradoxical situation has largely been responsible for the 
harmful drift of financial capitalism of the beginning of the 21th century (Aglietta & 
Rebérioux, 2004). 
We suggest that maximizing shareholder value is inconsistent with a value creation 
process achieved by a group of employees. While this idea is not new (Marx, 1867), the 
negative effects of these growing contradictory trends have not been taken into account. We 
advance that equating all assets to a financial asset, at least at a conceptual level, amounts to 
considering that human assets are generic, transferable, and separable from the individual that 
invests them. Actually, innovation resulting from partnerships strategies is not incompatible 
with the deep development of funds and information exchanges; however, human assets that 
support innovation cannot be coordinated and controlled solely by pure financial mechanisms. 
Consequently, if the paradox of shareholder primacy is maintained, the long-term viability of 
firms may be called into question. Furthermore, since specific human capital is a key element 
of economic power in the firm, traditional disciplinary methods of solving conflicts of interest 
and risk-sharing are obsolete. Other solutions are needed to deal with the intangible, 
inalienable and irreproducible nature of valuable human assets. In these circumstances, we 
suggest that firm governance has to be reconsidered to take into account the changing nature 
of firms since the 1990s. This paper considers firm governance as the general system by 
which the exercise of power on specific non-human and human assets is regulated. 
This paper has a dual purpose: (1) to propose a detailed analytical reading of the 
governance of specific human capital-intensive firms; (2) to suggest an original operational 
system supporting the new model of firm governance that we propose. Given the 
multidisciplinary nature of firm governance and moving beyond the legal-financial approach 
to corporate governance, this paper seeks to found an integrative theory of firm governance. It 
aims to propose new predictions and/or explain phenomena that cannot be explained by 
theories considered separately (Foss, 2000, p. 67). 
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The paper is organized as follows. The second section will show that the role of 
specific human capital, frequently neglected by economists writing about the firm, calls for a 
renewed model of firm governance. The aim of this model, which we call the ‘multi-resource 
model’ (Cézanne-Sintès, 2008), is to maintain and strengthen the links of economic 
dependency between the key members of the firm viewed as critical co-specific2
2. The maximization of multi-resource value 
 resources 
that develop the firm. Thus, firms built on specific human capital have to maximize their 
collective value potential; they have to optimize their multi-resource value. The third section 
will reformulate the central issue of the multi-resource model and try to infer underlying 
operational modes of governance. We will present the multi-resource governance as a 
composite model of internal regulation able to effectively mobilize specific human resources 
by motivating key employees. We argue that such a model of firm governance is achieved by 
the simultaneous use of vertical mechanisms of incentive, horizontal modes of work and 
decentralized decision-making processes. The fourth section will conclude the paper. 
In a context of contractual incompleteness, the creation and distribution of relational 
quasi-rent can be negatively affected by hold-up threats: employees who control specific 
inalienable assets can underinvest themselves. Consequently, the firm has to find the means to 
preserve its critical resources. We suggest that the regulation of power relationships gives rise 
to two main issues. Firstly, the firm has to encourage key employees to adhere to a common 
organizational purpose. Secondly, the firm has to guarantee continuously the co-specialization 
of valuable knowledge, skills and know-how. 
2.1. Ex post hold-up threats and the preservation of specific human capital 
A human capital-intensive firm can be defined as a firm whose value mainly depends 
on the human assets of the workers it employs. This conception inevitably implies that human 
capital is specific by nature; the field of application of specific human capital is limited 
outside the relationship in which it has been developed (Williamson, Wachter, & Harris, 
1975; Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978). At first sight, a human capital-intensive firm may 
seem to represent an extreme case of firms. We do not agree with this intuition; on the 
contrary, we think that the human capital-intensive firm is a common type of firms which is 
emblematic of “the new economy”. The new economy describes all sectors that make 
                                                            
2 According to Hall & Soskice (2001), co-specific assets are assets whose returns depend heavily on the active 
cooperation of other specific assets, which cannot readily be turned to another purpose. 
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important R&D efforts and base their innovation capabilities on intangible resources 
(Brynjolfsson, Hitt, & Yang, 2002). Thus, the new economy includes both new fast-growing 
sectors like biotechnology and traditional sectors in full transformation like the car industry. 
In this perspective, we aim to study the majority of current firms. 
The critical resource theory (Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Zingales, 2000) can be taken as 
the preferred framework to analyze human capital-intensive firms. In brief, the firm is viewed 
as a nexus of specific investments in human capital. Since human capital cannot be 
appropriated, the firm has an enlarged role of coordination: by giving access to a 
heterogeneous group of productive partners who participate in the division of labor, the firm 
manages ex ante the co-specialization of critical resources within its economic boundaries 
(Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Sautel & Sintès-Cézanne, 2007). In parallel, the multiple key 
partners controlling inalienable resources that are fundamental for the firm, in particular 
specialized employees have strong economic power; the firm does need their resources to 
develop its activity, to grow or even to survive. Following this representation of the firm, the 
problem of governance is to limit the exercise of power by strategic employees, on the one 
hand, and by the firm, on the other. The regulation of power relationships is central to 
protecting productive synergies within the firm and thus to creating a total value superior to 
the market value of the sum of individual contributions. Since power is fragmented, firm 
governance does not aim to protect the surplus of only one group of agents; economic 
dependency links between the firm and strategic employees call for a reconsideration of the 
internal power structure. Some economists have highlighted this rethinking of firm 
governance (Porter-Liebeskind, 2000; Rajan & Zingales, 2000; Keenan & Aggestam, 2001) 
but no specific studies have been made of it. 
Employment contracts are more incomplete than any other forms of contract because 
they concern human capital which is by nature intangible and non-transferable. Firstly, 
employees’ human capital is difficult to measure. Secondly, the value created by human 
capital is difficult to distinguish from the value created by other assets. Finally, the 
employment relationship is affected by a dual expropriation risk resulting from the economic 
interdependency between the employer and key employees. Each party would like to capture 
ex post a bigger share of the joint value they can create together (Tirole, 1993). On the one 
hand, since specific human capital is inalienable, and since contracts are not complete, the 
firm can expropriate a share of the quasi-rent superior to the value that its specific investments 
could pay. Such behavior is a major obstacle to productive cooperation and to an efficient 
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distribution of costs and surplus. On the other hand, critical employees know that their human 
capital is crucial for the productive activity and the competitiveness of the firm. They have 
inalienable residual rights of control over their critical resources, and thus over the firm 
(Gibbons, 2005). As soon as production process starts, strategic employees hold strong 
economic power, and consequently substantial negotiating power. These employees could 
expropriate a large fraction of the value of the firm by developing outside opportunities. 
When they accumulate enough power, central employees can underinvest or even exercise 
their legal right to leave the firm (Baron & Kreps, 1999). In particular, they can threaten to 
break the employment contract. Since contract breakdown cannot occur without loss for at 
least one of the contractual parties (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978), such a situation is 
very detrimental even if, most of the time, the firm is the party that breaks the contract3
Finally, to survive, the firm has to maintain specific relationships with key employees. 
Human capital-intensive firms must use governance mechanisms to incite ex post employees 
to invest in human capital within valuable firm activities (Wang & Barney, 2006). This is a 
sine qua non for the long-term viability of firms, especially innovative ones. Firms that 
operate on complex high tech markets characterized by high levels of R&D investments and 
specialized patented applications need their key employees to invest continuously and 
specifically in human capital (Guilhon, 2004). Thus, firm governance has to go beyond the 
traditional issues with which it has concerned itself. As power and rents depend mainly on 
critical inalienable resources, firm governance must not deal with efficient modes of conflict-
solving, to maximize shareholder or stakeholder value, but encourage key employees not to 
quit the firm, and to continuously make firm-specific human capital investments. In other 
words, strategic employees have to be encouraged to pursue their relationship with the firm so 
that the latter can retain the wealth indispensable to its productive activity. The governance of 
human capital-intensive firms that we describe in this paper as the ‘multi-resource model’ 
recognizes specialized employees as valuable complementary resources that enhance the 
. 
When a decisive employee leaves the firm, he reduces organizational and reputational values 
of the firm (Teece, 2003). By taking a part of the production team’s human capital, the 
employee deprives the firm of a critical link in the chain of specific investments. He can also 
cause the chain departure of specialized team members, that is to say workers who depend on 
him. In sum, a key employee can undermine the integrity of the firm. 
                                                            
3 Generally, the firm has to adapt its strategy to a competitive environment; thus the firm can decide to fire 
employees because their human capital is getting obsolete i.e. unsuited to market demand. In this case, 
employees’ power is noticeably reduced (Cornell & Shapiro, 1987). 
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collective value of the firm and ensure its long-term viability. The final objective of the multi-
resource model is to maximize the value of the various critical inalienable assets owned by 
key employees in the nexus of specific investments, i.e. to maximize multi-resource value. To 
reach this objective, the firm has to promote the superiority of collective interests over 
personal ones. This incentive issue may be considered traditional, but it is essential to prevent 
conflicts between productive partners and to avoid the decline or even the death of the firm. 
2.2. The priority of collective interests over personal ones: a matter of incentive 
Contractual theories of the firm agree that the question of the alignment of interests is 
an importance aspect of firm governance. But this issue is treated differently according to the 
definition of the firm. On the one hand, agency theory advocates that behavior has to be 
aligned to a superior individual interest, that of the principal, who is described as the unique 
residual claimant in the firm (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). On the 
other hand, transaction cost approaches suggest that interest alignment is ensured when 
everybody acts to satisfy the owner(s) of the property rights (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & 
Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). Despite analytical differences, contractual theories of the firm 
develop a legal vision of the firm in which the centralization of residual rights of control 
coordinates ex ante and ex post incentives. The conception of the firm as a nexus of specific 
investments in human capital, proposed by the critical resource theory, suggests that interest 
alignment should be reexamined in the light of the fragmentation of power resulting from the 
dispersion of inalienable residual rights of control (Rajan & Zingales, 2000; Zingales, 1998; 
Zingales, 2000). 
We argue that firm governance should aim to satisfy neither shareholder needs nor 
stakeholder expectations. Shareholder primacy and stakeholder legitimacy are challenged, in 
favor of a model of firm governance based on the defense of multiple critical resources. In 
fact, the multi-resource model has to ensure the alignment of collective interests. Each party 
has to be encouraged to give up her own ambitions to commit herself collectively in favor of 
the organizational welfare. From this perspective, firms can be considered as systems of 
cooperation of human activity (Barnard, 1938). Now, cooperation can be reached if the efforts 
of all critical resource-holders are focused on a common preferable goal. In particular, the 
maximization of multi-resource value depends on the complementarity links between all the 
critical resources, and requires incentives to organizational interest alignment. According to 
Gottschalg & Zollo (2007, p. 420), “organizational interest alignment can be defined as the 
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degree to which the members of the organization are motivated to behave in line with 
organizational goals”. 
We propose to analyze how different firm members can coordinate their actions in 
order to reach a collective goal without requiring an authoritarian or non-authoritarian 
external intervention. We focus on key employees who incorporate specific human capital 
within the employment relationship. Key employees have inalienable rights of control and 
need to be encouraged to behave in line with organizational goals, which are the employer’s 
goals. As for shareholders and managers, they are viewed as ordinary partners: they own 
generic resources and automatically behave in line with organizational goals. In this sense, 
what matters is the degree to which collective goals and the personal goals of key employees 
are aligned. Contrary to traditional approaches, we affirm that understanding how objectives 
have been set and who has prioritized them is of little use. We suggest that critical resource-
holders in human capital-intensive firms should embrace a common purpose from the 
beginning of the relationship with their firm. To serve this purpose, the multi-resource model 
of governance should perpetuate the alignment of organizational interests, and can thus 
maximize the creation of collective value and distribution of the surplus. 
Lasting commitment from key employees within the firm depends both on contract 
evolution and on outside options. More precisely, it depends on their negotiating power and 
on a fundamental right linked to their organizational membership (Rebérioux, 2005). To 
prevent underinvestment risks resulting from key employees’ exercise of power, the multi-
resource model of firm governance has to convince them that investing specifically is of 
benefit to them as much as it is to the firm. One solution could be to build a system that 
minimizes in all the stages of the employment relationship the distance between the diverse 
individual preferences, thereby reducing the tension in power relationships (Grandori & Soda, 
2004). In this context, employment relationship models and incentive systems need to be 
integrated, as McGregor (1960) suggests in the Y Theory. Lessons have been drawn from this 
seminal theory, and it has recently been reconsidered in incentive theory focused on the 
human dimension (Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2008). The main idea is to create conditions so 
that firm members can reach their own goals by turning their efforts towards the success of 
the firm. Preventing hold-up threats is not the only problem of the multi-resource model of 
firm governance. Since the firm is economically dependent on strategic employees, the 
maximization of its value potential requires the retention and enrichment of critical resources. 
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Thus, the prior aim of the multi-resources value approach is to co-specialize ex post key 
workers. 
2.3. Retaining and enriching critical resources: a question of ex post co-
specialization 
The collection of specific human resources within the production team (i.e. the firm) is 
a decisive factor of organizational quasi-rent creation (Aglietta, 1997). Because of productive 
synergies, the value of the firm is higher than the sum of the individual critical resource-
holders’ values (Engelen & Vanderberghe, 2005). We believe that the co-specialization of key 
employees is a central issue to optimize the multi-resource value: in this way, the firm must 
meet two challenges, retaining and enriching the critical resources these employees represent. 
We maintain that retaining critical resources within the firm means securing the 
loyalty of decisive employees, which means consolidating the employment relationship by 
empowering them. On the one hand, maintaining critical resources within the firm prevents 
reduction of the multi-resource value. Indeed, the firm can maximize multi-resource value if 
decisive employees are not incited to seize their outside opportunities. So, the firm should 
ensure key employees’ commitment over the long term by setting up obstacles to the 
exploitation of their human capital in another productive entity (Coff, 1997; Rajan & 
Zingales, 2000). However, the power of the firm should not be weakened too far, for fear that 
a disproportionate counter-power might jeopardize the joint value they can create together. On 
the other hand, the purpose of securing the loyalty of strategic employees is to obtain and 
protect the best possible combination of workers. Yet, contrary to what some authors state 
(Grandori & Soda, 2004; Roussel & Mesrar, 2007), it is no use securing the team of workers 
that maximize, at any given moment in time, investments in critical resources. In other words, 
we believe that a controlled turnover of labor-force within a bounded external market is not a 
solution. Employees who extend their knowledge portfolio energize the internal labor market 
but strengthen at the same time their employability, their outside opportunities, and thus their 
ex post negotiating power. We propose that a less wasteful solution would consist in retaining 
within the firm the same employees whose human capital would be maintained at the level of 
the market demand and needs by using accumulation and enrichment methods. In this way, 
specific human capital is enriched within the firm itself. 
The retention of firm-specific employees improves the stock of specific human capital. 
Consequently, specific human capital is endogenous within the context of the creative 
function of the firm (Benoît, 2005). Moreover, the retention of firm-specific employees fixes 
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the dependency relationships that link them to the employer by empowering each party. Even 
if the value creation process requires the use of co-specific resources that increase workers’ 
productivity only within the firm that employs them, it should not change these co-specific 
resources in core rigidities by maintaining too narrow a base of core skills (Leonard-Barton, 
1992). Rather, the firm and key employees should act in synergy to enrich specific resources. 
An appropriate internal market, characterized by a limited number of outside options during 
careers, can create such a favorable situation at the collective level. Indeed, employees who 
hold down a stable job foresee that it is in their interest to promote the firm’s prosperity and to 
behave cooperatively. As for the employer, he improves the efficiency of human resources 
allocation. The necessity to invest specifically in human capital consists in preventing its 
depreciation and its transferability. 
A model of firm governance adapted to specific human capital-intensive firms should 
optimize the combination of specific human assets in the most wealth-creative activities. In 
this way, the multi-resource model aims to (1) incite key workers to invest specifically and 
durably in human capital and (2) protect the firm’s investments themselves, to develop and 
exploit growth opportunities. This new model of firm governance is endogenous to the 
intangible, inalienable and difficult-to-reproduce nature of specific human assets (Rajan & 
Zingales, 1998; Wang, He, & Mahoney, 2009). In particular, it is based on the reinforcement 
of inalienable residual rights of control held individually by strategic employees. In other 
words, the multi-resource model of firm governance is composite: it consists in collectively 
encouraging, retaining and enriching key employees. 
3. The multi-resource value approach: a composite model of firm 
governance 
Employees who hold specific competences should be empowered to create value for 
all the critical resources that make up the firm, which is to say for themselves and for the firm 
(Rajan & Zingales, 2000). The multi-resource value approach is not reduced to a strict 
incentive issue; it aims to meet the global challenge of motivating key employees, which 
could be based on a multidimensional operational system. 
3.1. A global issue: the motivation to work 
Motivation describes all the conscious and unconscious causes which determine 
individual commitment behaviors in an activity. And work motivation points out that the 
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firm’s success depends on collective performances which themselves depend on individual 
results (Roussel, 2002). Thus, a strong work motivation results in more employees’ 
commitment, more innovation and more flexibility (Arnaud, Frimousse, & Peretti, 2009). 
Motivation can be considered through the double location of the activity’s impact: the 
activity performed has an impact that is external or internal to itself and an impact that is 
external or internal to the individual (De Charms, 1968). Firstly, the location of the activity’s 
impact in relation to itself allows to distinguish the diverse forms of extrinsic motivation from 
intrinsic motivation. If the effects of the activity are external to itself, motivation is extrinsic. 
Conversely, if the effects of the activity are internal, motivation is intrinsic. Secondly, self-
determination theory, originated by the social psychologists Deci and Ryan in the seventies, 
considers motivation through the location of the activity’s impact in relation to the individual. 
Self-determination describes the ability to choose within the largest number of possible 
situations, and implies that the three basic psychological needs – autonomy, skills and 
relatedness based on mutual respect and confidence – should be satisfied to foster well-being 
and health. Self-determination theory clarifies the definition of motivation, by considering the 
most fundamental psychological need, autonomy. This refers to the universal urge to be the 
causal agent of one’s own life and to act in harmony with one’s integrated self. Moreover, the 
need for autonomy founds individual choices when behavior is initiated (Deci & Ryan, 1985). 
The notion of self-determination underlies the analysis of the “motivational continuum” 
which depicts the degree to which employees, viewed as critical resource-holders, commit 
themselves to work (Gagné & Deci, 2005). This motivational continuum defines the level of 
self-determined motivation reached by an employee according to the degree of satisfaction of 
his need for autonomy. When the effects of the activity are external to him, a strategic 
employee finds reasons for commitment in the environment, for example on the basis of 
controls, constraints, promises or rewards. After amotivation, which defines the absence of 
self-determined motivation, external regulation is the weakest level of self-determined 
motivation that is called “extrinsic motivation”. On the contrary, when the effects of the 
activity are internal to the key employee, motivation is self-determined or self-regulated: the 
activity is enjoyed for itself and not for somebody or for reasons included in his environment. 
Thus, the individual need for autonomy is completely satisfied. Finally, if the effects of the 
activity are internal to the employee and external to the task accomplished, internalized 
extrinsic motivation is described. Internalized extrinsic motivation is a hybrid form of 
motivation that depends on the degree of internalization of the external regulation by the 
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individual (idem)4
Purely extrinsic motivation means that an individual acts only in order to obtain an 
outcome which is external to himself and to the task performed. In the domain of work, the 
employee is extrinsically motivated by getting results distinct from the work itself (Baron & 
Kreps, 1999; Deci & Ryan, 2000). He is also extrinsically motivated by certain actions and 
decisions of others, since they influence the consequences of his activities. Purely extrinsic 
motivation encourages the employee’s involvement in an activity for its monetary 
consequences (obtaining a higher remuneration through performance bonuses or a 
professional advancement), material consequences (improvement of work conveniences) and 
social consequences (search for reputation, for gratitude). Purely extrinsic motivation largely 
depends on contractual hierarchical mechanisms oriented by incentives and control: the 
disciplinary effect partly determines the balance between the increase of individual 
employees’ productivity and the regulation of opportunistic behavior. Several studies on 
financial remuneration modes and performance evaluation highlight the positive correlation 
between the use of such incentive mechanisms and employees’ purely extrinsic motivation 
(Prendergast, 1999; Lazear, 2000; Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders, & Taylor, 2002), in line with the 
recommendations of contractual theories of the firm. As we have explained, the multi-
resource model of firm governance has to meet the challenge of encouraging critical resource-
holders to behave according to the collective interest. This incentive issue can be solved by 
developing individual systems of external regulation. For example, financial and institutional 
participation systems or different forms of compensation extrinsically motivate key 
employees. Indeed, strategic employees are satisfied because they obtain an important 
financial return on their investments, or because they are identified as central members in the 
firm that allocates them formal residual rights of control (French & Rosenstein, 1984). 
Consequently, the role of the hierarchy in fixing remunerations is a major determinant in the 
multi-resource model of firm governance. 
. According to this interpretative framework, the firm can decide either to 
extrinsically motivate employees on the basis of an incentive system or to influence self-
determined motivations to “naturally” shape their behavior. From this perspective, we can 
clarify the concepts of extrinsic and self-determined motivation (intrinsic and internalized 
extrinsic motivation), and extend their comprehension to instruments that support the multi-
resource model of firm governance. 
                                                            
4 According to self-determination theory, internalization is an overarching term that refers to three different 
processes: introjection, identification, and integration. For more details, see Gagné & Deci (2005, pp. 334-336). 
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Intrinsic motivation comes from rewards inherent to an activity itself: it stems from 
the enjoyment of performing a task and from a need for immediate satisfaction (Deci & Ryan, 
2000). Intrinsic motivation is the perfect incarnation of self-determination. The activity itself 
is the reason why an intrinsically-motivated individual commits himself. No direct or indirect 
valuable consequences through incentives, constraints or sanctions are necessary for the 
individual to invest himself. Thus, an individual is intrinsically motivated when he voluntarily 
performs activities; he acts out of interest for the activity without expecting rewards and 
without hoping to avoid feeling guilty. Within the employment relationship, key employees 
are intrinsically motivated if they can directly satisfy their needs by working. Among others, 
cooperative relationships and willingly accepted organizational practices and work conditions 
support intrinsic motivation. In the context of the multi-resource model, granting autonomy 
and giving employees a sense of responsibility relieves them of the feeling of hierarchical 
control. In addition, it encourages self-subordination to the collective organizational interest. 
Freedom of action, liberty granted to employees, “raises the perceived self-determination of 
employees and therewith strengthens intrinsic motivation” (Osterloh & Frey, 2000, p. 543). In 
turn, this may lead to an increase of their creativity in the pursuit of organizational goals 
(Foss, Foss, & Vazquez, 2006). Moreover, a positive correlation may link employee 
participation, on the one hand, with trust levels, intrinsic compensation, involvement in 
organization, work satisfaction and the stress level, on the other (Bélanger, 2000). From this 
perspective, we believe that labor organization and labor division underpin the alignment of 
interests and the co-specialization of specific human assets when social capital is favorable. In 
fact, the durability of employment relationships is ensured by organizational practices that are 
innovative, attractive and useful in themselves. Intrinsic motivation creates a common will to 
increase the value of the team production’s collective specificity. In addition, Baard, Deci, & 
Ryan (2004) empirically highlight a positive correlation between a work organization 
favorable to autonomy and competences and, on the one hand, a high degree of intrinsic 
motivation, adaptability and changes and on the other, high levels of performance. 
Like intrinsic motivation, internalized extrinsic motivation depends on self-
determination, since individuals undertake an activity because they want to. Deci & Ryan 
(2000) argue that self-determination can be analyzed beyond the principle of satisfying the 
vital need for autonomy. According to these authors, internalization takes place when 
individuals perform an activity not because this activity is interesting and satisfies a need in 
itself, but because it is fundamental and has a value for them. In other words, internalized 
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extrinsic motivation corresponds to individuals’ commitment to the importance that they give 
to values, norms and other significations represented by the activity undertaken and the 
resulting satisfaction (Ouchi, 1980). From this perspective, notably, a key employee accepts 
voluntarily to undertake pro-social actions, which are actions aiming to help or benefit others 
(Eisenberg, 1982; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2008). More generally, 
a strategic employee deliberately adopts an observable behavior aimed at supporting the 
collective benefit or sharing costs and benefits with the group. As far as the multi-resource 
model of firm governance is concerned, the representation of the most essential employees on 
the board of directors, for example, does not affect intrinsic motivation because of long and 
tiresome assemblies or even hard debates concerning strategies of the firm. Rather, it affects 
internalized extrinsic motivation by asserting the employees’ point of view and aiming to 
safeguard co-specific resources within the firm. The motivating factor does not come from the 
task itself, which can be uninteresting; it comes from the meaning of the motivation, moral 
values and social norms that employees’ representation promotes or allows to reach through 
its effects, and from the resulting collective utility. A key employee internalizes these 
externalities and does not need to be extrinsically motivated by disciplinary incentives. 
We believe that self-regulated motivations self-strengthen the power of the employer 
and of strategic employees in human capital-intensive firms. On the one hand, strategic 
employees are aware that they control critical resources, and need to be intrinsically 
motivated because they hold inalienable residual rights of decision on them. Thus, they want 
to enjoy their specific relationship with the firm. On the other hand, strategic employees 
should acknowledge that respecting collective interests and guaranteeing co-specialization are 
two vital issues for the durability and the growth of the firm. Under these conditions, they 
internalize extrinsic sources of motivation. The human capital-intensive firm has to set up 
mechanisms allowing key employees to internalize the constraint of the long-term 
employment relationship; key employees do not need strong autonomy to behave according to 
organizational goals and to enrich the specific human capital that they control. 
Economists of the firm re-construe the concept of motivation originated by social 
psychologists. For example, Baker, Jensen, & Murphy (1988, p. 593) argue that “a thorough 
understanding of internal incentives is critical to developing a viable theory of the firm, since 
they largely determine how individuals behave in organizations”. Non-economic practices 
like trust, equity, culture or moral should be taken into account in addition to traditional 
economic incentives. According to Gottschalg (2004), the concept of motivation even builds 
15 
the renewal of the theory of the firm and the rethinking of corporate governance, while 
contractual approaches of the firm base their analysis only on control and incentives (i.e. on 
purely extrinsic motivation). We advance that the balance of powers between the employer 
and critical employees entails offsetting the different forms of motivation. Thus, the multi-
resource value approach aims to tackle the global issue of motivating key employees from the 
perspective of “motivational self-reinforcement”. 
3.2. The self-reinforcement of motivations 
If the economic literature has focused on the effects of extrinsic regulations on 
intrinsic motivation (crowding theory of motivation: Frey, 1997; Osterloh & Frey, 2000; Frey 
& Jegen, 2001), no consensus has emerged about the nature of those effects. By suggesting 
that there is a reciprocal (not a one-way) dynamic relationship between the purely extrinsic 
motivation and the intrinsic motivation of individuals, we are taking position in favor of 
motivational complementarity. According to the theory of supermodularity (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1995), the marginal efficiency of a factor – in this case the purely extrinsic 
motivation – increases with the level of another factor – in this case the intrinsic motivation, 
and vice versa. When contracts are incomplete, the key advantage of intrinsic motivation is 
that it can remedy the inefficiency of incentives. Intrinsic motivation is indispensable when 
extrinsic motivation cannot resolve certain extracontractual problems, because employees’ 
behavior cannot be observed or because the results cannot be attributed to individuals 
(Osterloh & Frey, 2004). In particular, the intrinsic dimension protects the specific 
relationship between specialized employees and the employer by strengthening the attraction 
of employees to their work and favoring their attachment to the firm. It also contributes to the 
creation and pooling of knowledge by ensuring the involvement and collaboration of 
employees in production teams. Ultimately, intrinsic motivation offsets the harmful effects of 
tangible forms of external regulation. For example, an employee may be handsomely paid for 
the work he does, but if he derives no satisfaction from accomplishing his task, he may 
eventually decide to leave the firm, taking with him a share of the organizational rent. But if 
the firm succeeds in coupling the extrinsic motivation of financial incentive with a system that 
favors intrinsic motivation, by giving employees more responsibility or initiative, for 
example, then it can maintain the specificity of the employment relationship over the long 
term. This will form the basis of our argument for the need to combine the intrinsic and 
extrinsic dimensions of motivation within the framework of the multi-resource governance 
model. 
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From our point of view, the self-reinforcement of motivations is taken to an extreme 
when internalized extrinsic motivation is considered, hitherto neglected by many authors who 
have classified it too hastily in the domain of the extrinsic, or confusedly in the domain of the 
intrinsic (Amabile, 1993; Frey, 1997; Kreps, 1997; Osterloh & Frey, 2000; Bénabou & Tirole, 
2003). Internalized extrinsic motivation is an intermediate form of self-determination with an 
intrinsic component and an extrinsic component. We argue that an appropriate degree of 
assimilation and acceptance of the external constraint by a key employee achieves a balance 
between the need to transmit the rules to him and the satisfaction of his need for autonomy. 
Moreover, introducing a measure of control based on individual self-regulation (not only 
based on external regulation) can be effective because it generates a feedback effect on the 
individual’s need for skill and social relations without negating the need for autonomy. In 
turn, the internalization of incentives has a positive influence on the employee’s behavior at 
work. Therefore, it is important to recognize the role of internalized extrinsic motivation in 
developing the loyalty and commitment of employees, especially managerial staff (Colle, 
Peretti, & Cerdin, 2005). 
Ultimately, purely extrinsic motivation and self-regulated motivation should be 
combined. The overall motivation of key employees is a fundamental condition of the 
regulation of powers in the employment relationship. The multi-resource model of firm 
governance supports this point of view in terms of both the issues and the methods involved. 
We argue that this new model of firm governance can achieve the self-reinforcement of 
motivations with the help of different instruments that are themselves complementary. 
3.3. A combination of different mechanisms 
In keeping with Rebérioux (2005), we believe that firm governance needs to be 
developed to take into account three decisive elements in the new vision of the firm: (i) the 
importance of human capital and its inappropriable and inimitable nature, (ii) the 
complementarity and inseparability of assets, and (iii) the incompleteness of contracts. 
According to Grandori & Kogut, (2002, p. 225), “Knowledge complexity, differentiation and 
specialization, complementarity, and interdependence are emerging as important 
contingencies affecting effective organization and governance solutions”. Emphasis on the 
centrality of co-specific resources, and therefore emphasis on the collective character of 
organizational rent, implies to found the multi-resource governance model, distinct from the 
standard contractual models. 
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Since it is not possible to contractualize the income to be expected from investments in 
specific human capital and because the value-added of each individual’s contributions is hard 
to measure, other methods should be considered than the simple use of incentives or purely 
extrinsic motivation. Instruments of protection of the collective interest and the retention and 
enrichment of specific human capital are endogenous to the firm and therefore take into 
account the specificity of its critical resources. We uphold the idea that the multi-resource 
firm governance encompasses mechanisms of extrinsic motivation and self-regulated 
motivation. In other words, the complementarity of motivations suggests a complementarity 
in the governance practices that seek to promote them. The multi-resource value approach 
requires a balanced combination of financial and non-financial controlling mechanisms 
(purely extrinsic motivation) and a new set of practices of organization and coordination (self-
regulated motivations). This combination allows to take into account the double location of 
sources of motivation and to evaluate the effects of the composite operational system on the 
regulation of power within the organization (Deci & Ryan, 2000). The combination of 
extrinsic and intrinsic dimensions generates an effect of virtuous synergy for the firm: it 
guarantees control over the multilateral risks of ex post expropriation and valorization of the 
co-specific resources. Consequently, the multi-resource model can be operationalized in the 
form of protective structures for the specific employment relation. In line with March & 
Simon (1958), we advance that individuals’ decisions to cooperate and effectively participate 
in the firm are organizational problems of incentive and coordination. 
The conditions of use of the labor force in the productive activity, viewed from the 
microeconomic perspective of the motivation to work rather than the increase in production 
capacities (Boyer, 2004), can serve as the basis for a characterization of the operational 
instruments of the multi-resource model of firm governance. The trend towards more 
individualized wage practices and the shift in productive coordination towards a more 
collective approach supply tangible elements of the redistribution of powers within the 
modern firm. In other words, parallel tendencies to the verticalization of incentives and 
horizontalization of work organization account for innovative high-performance work 
practices. The latter are gradually replacing the practices of the Taylor model and transferring 
power to employees (Cappelli & Neumark, 2001). Most of the literature views these new 
forms of payment and coordination as an expression of a degradation of the employment 
relationship in favor of the employer (Boltanski & Chiappello, 1999; Ramsey, Scholarios & 
Harley, 2000). Indeed, it is often argued that the aim of current human resources management 
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policies is to improve labor productivity and flexibility to the detriment of employees’ welfare 
(Green & McIntosh, 2001; Green, 2004; Askenazy, Cartron, De Coninck & Gollac, 2006). 
But this point of view has been hotly challenged on the basis of documented studies (Guérin, 
Wils & Lemire, 1997; Berg, 1999; Appelbaum & Berg, 2000). Our belief is that the new 
forms of labor force organization may possibly constitute a toughening of work conditions for 
employees with generic human capital, but that the same is not true in the case of employees 
with specific human capital. For the latter, they represent a way of making voluntary the 
application and enrichment of the knowledge and skills underlying the improvement of the 
relationships specific to the organization. Consequently, we shall consider the verticalization 
of incentives and the horizontalization of work as key instruments of work motivation and not 
as the manifestation of an intensive use of the labor force. In addition to these two modern 
practices for strengthening key employees’ commitment, the third fundamental dimension is 
the decentralization of operational and strategic decision-making, in other words the 
delegation of residual rights of control in the domains of production and management. In 
broad outline, the combination of these three types of strategic practices create a work 
environment favorable to the intrinsic motivation of employees (horizontalization of work) 
and the internalization of external regulation (decentralization of decision-making) while at 
the same time rewarding the development of specific skills (verticalization of incentives). In 
the end, without appropriate economic incentives, interesting work content and shared norms 
and values, employees may be discouraged from investing in non-transferable specific human 
capital, preferring to invest in more general skills that can be exploited outside the firm. 
These forms of specific human assets management are not strictly part of the 
mechanisms of governance; they lie outside the field of what is traditionally covered by the 
term corporate governance or firm governance. Nevertheless, their objectives undoubtedly 
involve the value creation and preservation. There is a point, therefore, where the forms of 
human resources management (HRM) and the mechanisms of governance interpenetrate 
(Pollin, 2004), while it is acknowledged that firm governance and the ownership structure of 
firms influence HRM (Deakin, Hobbs, Konzelmann, & Wilkinson, 2006; Deakin & 
Rebérioux, 2009). In this perspective, the most recent theories of the firm maintain, like Blair 
(1999), that the governance mechanisms of the relationships between employees and the firm 
should no longer be treated separately from firm governance. Even if the general policy of the 
firm is mainly determined by its executive officers and the maximization of value is their 
responsibility, the centrality of human capital prohibits us from neglecting the role assigned to 
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HRM in firm governance. By means of incentives, control mechanisms and organizational 
practices, its objective is to maximize collective wealth. We therefore affirm that the 
operational model of governance can be considered in a broader perspective than the 
traditional models that are strictly limited to the legal conditions of the allocation of alienable 
control rights among stakeholders. We consider the multi-resource model of firm governance 
as the whole set of mechanisms motivating key employees to work together to maximize the 
rents of co-specific human capital and make them completely available. According to this 
definition, the verticalization of incentives, the horizontalisation of work and the 
decentralization of decision-making powers make up the operational multi-resource model of 
firm governance. 
4. Conclusion 
In this article, we have shown that the mobilization of specific human assets in the 
division of labor calls for a rethinking of the regulation of power exercise within a context of 
preservation of economic dependence relationships. Therefore, we have proposed a revised 
model of governance for specific human capital-intensive firms; we call this the multi-
resource model of firm governance. Unlike traditional disciplinary models, which seek to 
satisfy residual claimants’ particular interests, this new model of governance is collective by 
nature: it aims to ensure that the co-specific investments in key resources are lasting and 
prosperous. We have explained that the maximization of multi-resource value requires to 
encourage, retain and enhance employees’ specific human capital within a logic of productive 
complementarities; ultimately, it is based on a global issue of motivation of long-term specific 
relationships. The multi-resource value can only be maximized by and for individuals who are 
rewarded and self-determined. In addition, we have affirmed that the complementarity 
between motivations should be supported by complementary instruments, to ensure that in the 
future, the key employees receive appropriate rent and satisfaction; to achieve the self-
reinforcement of motivations, the multi-resource model of firm governance should make a 
synergic use of operational mechanisms. Thus, we have suggested that a combination of 
vertical incentive practices, horizontal work methods and decentralized decision-making 
founds the multi-resource model of firm governance. 
The research agenda about the multi-resource model of firm governance is not 
exhausted. If it is adapted to the valorization of co-specific human assets, the multi-resource 
model of firm governance will help to create competitive advantages and so generate gains for 
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the firm that implements it. These gains find expression in the maintenance and exploration of 
growth opportunities contained in inimitable assets and in the extension and exploitation of 
growth opportunities by the implementation of multi-resource governance. In other words, 
future research would have to show that key resources and the complementary tools of 
governance that mobilize them are a joint source of performance for specific human capital-
intensive firms. 
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